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THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL SOCIETY: INTRODUCTION
Presented in the symposium on the Emergence of Global Society. 78th Annual Meeting,
American Anthropological Association. Cincinnati, Ohio, November 29, 1979.
Alvin W. Wolfe,
University of South Florida Tampa, Florida 33620
This symposium on the emergence of global society is a welcome expression of a revival of
interest by anthropologists in issues of world-wide scale. When I first became interested in
international, multinational, affairs in the 50s and early 60s, many anthropologists believed such
matters to be the proper domain of economists and political scientists only. Among those not
satisfied with an anthropology limited to any traditional subject matter was, of course, Margaret
Mead. By example and by direct encouragement, she urged us not to shrink from treating major
world issues. A little later, in a paper entitled “Alternatives to War," Mead drew upon a series of
anthropological contributions to attempt to distill, as she put it, "new combinations and new
forms that will release us from our historically limited imaginations" (1968: 224-225)"
There is now more interest in matters of international scale (Bodley 1976). The International
Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences has devoted several symposia to such
issues (Idris-Soven, Idris-Soven, and Vaughn 1978; Maruyama and Harkins 1978). Eric Wolf's
Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (1969) and Richard Adams Energy and Structure (1975)
certainly address that level. As the 1980's approach, more anthropologists are beginning to sense
more thoroughly the smallness of the globe on which we live. We are now beginning to feel
directly the interdependence we have long spoken of in theory. Energy problems -- oil, on the
one hand, nuclear power on the other --have enhanced our awareness of interdependence. The
capacity to communicate around the world and into space almost instantaneously is a
technological achievement that makes global cultural integration not merely possible but
inevitable. Whether we like it or not, events on opposite s ides of the globe, or on opposite sides
of whatever artificial barriers people erect, are mutually contingent. The mutual contingency of
events results not only from the fact that we draw upon the same sources of physical, material
energies but also from the fact that we know so much about each other that those on one side of
the earth "respond” to what they "think" those on the other side will do. Humankind was never
before so immediately interdependent. If global integration is not here, it is clearly emerging.
That emergence affects not only the wealthy, but, for good or ill, it affects also the poor in their
familiar communities.
The emergence of global society is, in my view, nothing less than the evolution of a new system
at a higher level of integration. This does not mean the loss of all our present institutions, but it
does mean significant change. It is as Julian Steward said in 1951: In culture, simple forms, such
as those represented by the family or band, do not wholly disappear when a more complex state
of development is reached, nor do they merely survive fossil-like. They gradually become
modified as specialized dependent parts of new kinds of total configurations" (1951:379). My
own attempts to study this modern evolutionary process cause me to believe that scholars of the
past, and many still today have overemphasized the nation-state, treating it as if it were a
fundamental component of the universe instead of merely one among many institutional products
of cultural evolution, vulnerable as any other to changing natural, technological and symbolic
conditions (Wolfe 1977, 1999). The nation-state, along with other systems of lesser scale, may
be in for' significant modification, in Steward's terms, “as specialized, dependent parts of new
kinds of total configurations.”
To understand the emergence of global society, we must understand evolution.
For me a most important concept to appreciate in connection with social and cultural evolution is
the distinction between different levels of sociocultural integration. There are many ways in
which this distinction can be understood or misunderstood.

When I use it I emphasize an element of discontinuity in sociocultural structure and process.namely, that within a sociocultural system is a hierarchy of sub-systems each with some identity
of its own. For example, within a nation-state are communities that have some identity of their
own even if they are also parts of the larger system. Within each of those communities are still
smaller sociocultural systems, some form or forms of domestic units that also have their own
identities.
Although we may say all sociocultural systems exhibit some degree of integration, the mode of
integration of systems at different levels is not necessarily the same.
The forces that compel the members of a family "to interact: with one another systematically are
quite different from the forces that compel systematic interaction within a community or nation.
Herein lays the important discontinuity. The rules or principles that govern systems at different
levels in such a hierarchy are different.
The hierarchy is composed of qualitatively distinct systems. It has been our mistake to expect
one set of scientific generalizations to cover sociocultural systems at different levels. In the
physical sciences, different principles are called upon to account for the integration of elements
at different levels in the hierarchy of material systems -- electrostatic and molecular forces
govern the organization of microcosms, at the level of quarks, or at the level of corpuscles or at
the level of atoms; at the other extreme of scale, gravitation governs in the macrocosms of
satellite systems and galaxies. Actually, at least fourteen distinct levels of material systems have
been identified, from the minute quarks defined only in the past few years, up to that which is
called the universe, still incompletely comprehended, above the galaxies and metagalaxies. In
the biological realm, also, are different systems organized by different principles -- from the
colloidal aggregates where the biological hierarchy branches off from the merely physical, to the
cell to cell aggregates, to organisms, to populations, to ecosystems. Even though they are called
equally biological, the systems at different levels of the organic hierarchy are governed by
different principles. What makes a cell function as a system is not the same as what keeps an
organism alive, notwithstanding that the systems at different levels in the organic hierarchy are
interdependent.
Analogous to these other systemic hierarchies is the sociocultural hierarchy that diverges, in still
another dimension, from the organic hierarchy. Where an aggregate of organisms form a
domestic group whose integration depends on some cultural principles, we have the first level of
sociocultural integration.
How do we get from such meager beginnings to an anticipated global society? Certainly not by
mere expansion, any more than a galaxy is an expanded atom or an organism an expanded cell. If
we are to understand a system such as global society we must first appreciate the complexity of
the hierarchy of sociocultural systems. Global society and global culture will not be merely an
expansion of one or more of our current systems, but will be a new synthesis using as its
components modified forms of the subsystems that now exist. From this perspective a global
social system encompasses a hierarchy of subsystems more or less autonomous and dependent
with respect to the total configuration.
The phrase "more or less autonomous and dependent with respect to the total configuration"
deserves some clarification. For too many years social scientists have tried to use, in their
analyses, only units that are well defined, logically disparate, and empirically bounded. Now,
social scientists (and other natural scientists as well) are coming to recognize that, in order to
make complex phenomena understandable. Our theoretical formulations must have at least as
much flexibility as the phenomena we study. Instead of assuming that a system is well-bounded
and that every part is, by definition, within that boundary, we must take the interdependence of

components as problematic, so that system parts may be, as I said, “more or less autonomous and
dependent with respect to the total configuration."
The biologist Richard Lewontin (1978) identifies as the two most fundamental characteristics of
the evolutionary process the characteristics of "quasi-independence" and "continuity,"
demonstrating clearly that where change is a reality the states of phenomena are not rigidly
bounded but are rather supplely bordered. It is not a question of being vague, but rather of being
explicit about the indeterminacy in the phenomena. Mathematical developments such as the
theory of fuzzy sets (West 1976. Zadeh 1974), can help us work with concepts that are flexible in
this sense. The use of network models to analyze situations where groups are not well defined is
another example of deliberate flexibility in our way of thinking. Adrian Mayer (1966) has used
the tern quasi-group in recognition of the action potential of moderately structured social
relationships in social systems. Even the concept "society" needs to be reconsidered, for all
societies are much more open systems than earlier theories would have them. While there may be
some hyperbole in it, a statement made by Herbert Simon (1973) gives us pause:
A society is fundamentally a simple system, not a complex one. In organization it is more akin to
a mass of colonial algae than to a highly synchronized machine. Its main regularities are
statistical regularities, and its parameters statistical aggregates (1973:3).
If the important concepts are not black and white but rather gradations of gray, how is it that we
arrive, through evolutionary processes operating on weakly bounded units, ultimately, at
"qualitatively distinctive systems at different levels of sociocultural integration”? Many
evolutionists have emphasized, after all, the continuous nature of changes. Carneiro (1974)
stresses the point that there are no saltations in cultural evolution, but only graduate
accumulation of cultural elements. Even Lewontin (1978) to whom I have just referred on the
matter of quasi-independence stresses continuity as the other fundamental characteristic of
evolution.
As it turns out, there is developing a mathematical theory that may describe well the kinds of
generative processes of which we speak, where a continuously changing factor has an abruptly
changing effect. Derived from topology, this useful theory, originally presented by Rene Thom
(1972) as structural stability and morphogenesis, has come to be called "catastrophe theory.”
What happens is this. Relatively sudden transformations – like the water freezing. a gas
becoming a liquid, a nation moving from a peaceful state to one of war – can be reasonably
modeled as folds, cusps, and other shapes of a surface which represents all the equilibrium points
of the subject phenomenon.
Imagine that several controlling factors such as costs of warfare and degree of external threat
control whether a government decides on war or on appeasement. These factors may relate in
such a way that when costs are high there is an overlap (a fold or cusp, technically) in the surface
representing the probability of war. In the area of that overlap there is societal ambivalence -doves would not, and hawks would, go to war when threat reaches this range. Somewhere within
that range, war may erupt in a catastrophic denouement, a saltation from the low side to the high
side of the surface which is still appropriately represented as continuous. Isnard and Zeeman
(1976) put it well: "The objective . . . is the qualitative characterization of those points where
small variations in some variable way cause large variations in a dependent variable, in other
words those points where ‘catastrophic change’ may occur. This is the reason for the name
"catastrophe theory" (p.44). Noting that sciences dealing with such apparent discontinuities and
divergences have heretofore been labeled "inexact sciences," they continue, “However, the
creation of catastrophe theory has now revealed that sudden change and divergence are not only
natural, and interrelated, but also amenable to rigorous mathematical treatment" (p. 45). The
objective is to provide qualitative understanding and global insight.

This new method of analysis will help us to model, and hence to understand a variety of
morphogenetic phenomena which appear to be qualitative leaps. I am interested particularly in
what the method may offer toward understanding how subsystems controlled first primarily by
local factors come, sometimes catastrophically, under the control of factors deriving from a
wider, subsuming system. In evolutionary terms, it holds promise of helping us to understand
how a new sociocultural system can emerge at a higher level of integration: gradual cumulative
changes in sociocultural and ecological variables result at some point in a catastrophic leap
representing the consolidation of the wider system. Here and now, that means the autonomy of
nation-states and multinational corporations would be constrained by some integrative factors of
the emerging global system.
That there are identifiable sociocultural systems arranged hierarchically within wider complex
systems has more than mere heuristic significance. Actually, the hierarchical arrangement
improves the probability of the evolution of a still higher level of system. Or to put it another
way, as does Herbert Simon (1977):
“One can show on quite simple and general grounds that the time required for a complex system
containing K elementary components, say, to evolve by processes of natural selection from those
components is very much shorter if the system is itself comprised of one or more layers of stable
component subsystems than if its elementary parts are its only stable components” (pp. 247-248).
Simon follows this with a parable of two watchmakers assembling fine watches. “Each
watchmaker is interrupted frequently to answer the phone. The first has organized his total
assembly operation into a sequence of subassemblies; each subassembly is a stable arrangement
of 100 elements, and each watch a stable arrangement of 100 subassemblies. The second
watchmaker has no such organization. The average interval between phone interruptions is a
time long enough to assemble about 150 elements. An interruption causes any set of elements
that does not yet form a stable system to fall apart completely. By the time he has answered
about eleven phone calls, the first watchmaker will usually have finished assembling a watch.
The second watchmaker will almost never succeed in assembling one – he will suffer the fate of
Sisyphus: As often as he rolls the rock up the hill, it will roll down again” (p. 248).
Lest the notion of hierarchy be misunderstood, especially in reference to the global situation we
are concerned with here, let me state that a hierarchically arranged system need not be centrally
controlled, need not be monopolistic. To say that there is interdependence among the component
units is not to say that some control while others are only controlled. To say that subsystems are
contained within systems of wider scale is not to say that components are more controlled by the
wider system than by the lesser systems.
It remains an empirical question to discover how and to what degree the system or systems of
global scale constrain or compel the behavior of constituent subsystems and institutional
components such as nation-states, multinational corporations, cities, families, and so forth. In a
recent paper I argue that the decline of state power commensurate with the currently increasing
activity of multinational corporations has increased the autonomy of some cities, relative, at
least, to the states wherein they are located (Wolfe 1979). I do not suggest that we already know
how global society will be organized. I am saying that if we see the current situation as a process
generating a new system at a higher level of integration we have the opportunity to learn much
about it.
The major papers in this symposium will present different aspects of the problem. Eric Wolf
addresses the historic and on-going processes of the emergence of a world system dominated by
capitalism, emphasizing the heterogeneity of the system itself, and the tendencies toward
differentiation inherent in it. Richard Adams, concerned with the shift from homogeneity within

and diversity between cultures to heterogeneity within and similarity between cultures of wider
scale, presents concepts toward a theory of cultural emergence. Laura Nader points up how
disciplinary and other boundaries impede not only the study but also the resolution of problems
people share, a condition which may explain why there is a lot of groping for something new.
Whether global society will ameliorate or exacerbate such problems remains to be seen.
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